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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to explore the micropolitics of middle managers in influencing the development and outcome 
of a centre-led change initiative. This study was empirically based on a novel context in a Malaysia based multinational 
company (MNC) and four of its Asian subsidiaries. This qualitative study was conducted through a multiple embedded case 
study approach. The findings demonstrate that middle managers have within their powers to influence the development and 
eventually the outcome of change. This was achieved through control of middle managers on resources such as business 
knowledge and networking in influencing the meaning of change itself. This article allows the authors to investigate 
an in-depth exploration of how subsidiary managers operate. It contributes to the change literature by expanding the 
knowledge about the tight coupling between power and politics of organizational sensemaking.     
Keywords: Alliances; multinational firms; telecommunications; international business; Asia.
ABSTRAK
Tujuan artikel ini adalah untuk mengenal pasti taktik yang diamalkan oleh pengurus pertengahan syarikat multinational 
untuk mempengaruhi perkembangan dan hasil daripada inisiatif perubahan yang diterajui oleh pusat. Kajian empirikal 
ini adalah berdasarkan kepada kajian novel dalam sebuah syarikat multinasional Malaysia dan empat anak syarikatnya 
yang beroperasi di Asia. Kajian kualitatif ini telah dijalankan melalui pendekatan kajian kes bertindan/embedded. Hasil 
kajian menunjukkan bahawa pengurusan anak syarikat mempunyai kuasa untuk mempengaruhi inisiatif perubahan di 
peringkat pembangunan dan akhirnya hasil inisiatif tersebut. Ini dicapai melalui kawalan sumber oleh pengurus anak 
syarikat seperti pengetahuan perniagaan dan rangkaian untuk mempengaruhi makna perubahan itu sendiri. Artikel 
ini membolehkan penulis penerokaan bagaimana pengurus anak syarikat beroperasi. Kajian ini menyumbang kepada 
kesusasteraan perubahan dengan mengembangkan pengetahuan mengenai gandingan rapat antara kuasa dan politik 
sensemaking organisasi.
Kata kunci: Pakatan; syarikat multinasional; telekomunikasi; perniagaan antarabangsa; Asia.
INTRODUCTION
A considerable amount of literatures has been published 
on Multinational Company (MNC) parent subsidiary 
relationship issues that comprised of strategy structure, 
subsidiary role stream, HQ-subsidiary stream and 
subsidiary development stream. The issues relating to 
MNC parent subsidiary relationship has recently gained 
momentum among others due to the existence of newly 
complex structure and relationship between the two 
entities (Balogun, Fahy & Vaara 2019; Ryan et al. 2018). 
The idea of differentiated network was perhaps among the 
enabler for the study of MNC parent-subsidiary dynamic 
relationship (Ghoshal & Nohria 1986; Hedlund 1986). 
Differentiated network and the later transnational solution 
finally gave prominence to the subsidiary entity which was 
previously eclipsed by the MNC itself (Bartlett & Ghoshal 
2002). Many studies assumed that traditional power and 
political struggles between functional and country specific 
subsidiary unit can be avoided through the development of 
shared goals and global learning (Bouquet & Birkinshaw 
2008b; Vora & Kostova 2007). 
In the International Business literature, there is 
a dearth of literatures studying the micro aspects of 
subsidiary management particularly the key actors 
who are involved in the dynamic relationship between 
headquarter and subsidiaries. Studies to date has focused 
on the examination of the MNC headquarter-subsidiary 
relationship rather than the impact of power and politics 
within the MNCs. However, there were a few of studies that 
explore this facet within the MNCs (e.g. Geppert, Becker-
Ritterspach & Mudambi 2016; Hong, Snell & Mak 2016). 
In addition, the study of power, politics and conflicts in 
the MNC subsidiary largely investigates key actors such 
as middle managers (Balogun, Bartunek & Do 2015; 
Lundgren-Henriksson & Kock 2016). The ambiguity and 
a multitude of divergent interpretations of micro politics 
and conflicts in MNCs (Dorrenbacher & Geppert 2006), 
has led the researcher to question  ‘how’ and ‘why’ key 
actors ‘do’ what they ‘do’ in such situations. Hence, the 
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aim of this paper is to explore the organisational politics 
that emerge when middle managers from the subsidiaries 
faced with competing roles during the implementation of 
centre-led change initiative. The study draws from several 
organisational sensemaking/sensegiving theory (Maitlis 
2005; Maitlis & Lawrence 2007), middle management 
literature (Rouleau & Balogun 2011; Teulier & Rouleau 
2013) and literature on power and politics (Conroy, 
Collings & Clancy 2017; Geppert et al. 2016). The paper 
allows insight on how middle managers employ certain 
tactics to influence the development and the overall 
outcome of centre-led change initiative.
LITERATURE REVIEW
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT – SENSEMAKING IN CHANGE
In the general literature, a steady growth of research 
exists in micro processes that underlie organisational 
change (e.g. Balogun et al. 2015; Giuliani 2016). One 
of the primary theoretical lens applied by these scholars 
is sensemaking. Weick (1988) defines sensemaking as 
assigning meaning to experience. However, many have 
advanced the exploration of sensemaking especially in 
organisational sensemaking (Geppert 2003; Maitlis & 
Christianson 2014; Maitlis & Sonenshein 2010). Within 
the sensemaking literature, there appears to be two 
dominant issues which are mostly being debated namely, 
i) sensemaking in crisis (Milad Mirbabaie & Elisa Zapatka 
2017; Sarkar & Osiyevskyy 2017), and ii) sensemaking 
in change (Guiette & Vandenbempt 2017). Hence, the 
obvious focus on sensemaking activities that is relevant to 
this study is on the actors who were involved in strategic 
change processes. These individuals have a profound 
influence on how others adapt the meaning of change and 
how they react to change. Eventually, this then affects how 
the overall organisation adapts to those changes. 
Organisational members such as leaders, middle 
managers and stakeholders engage in sensemaking such 
as in environmental scanning that influences decision 
making and strategic change (Gioia & Thomas 1996). 
Maitlis (2005: 21) explains that in organisational 
sensemaking, members scan their environment through 
their interactions with others, ‘constructing accounts that 
allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively.’ 
Individuals tend to behave in a routine state of “trance,” 
when the organisation is in a state of stability. However, 
when change is introduced, individuals’ routines are 
interrupted where they would and should be more 
alert to their surroundings. They interact with others in 
making sense of what is going on around and figure out 
methods to respond (Weick 1995). Individuals engage 
in conversations, exchanging gossip, stories, rumours 
and memories about their experience. They take note of 
symbolic actions and behaviours (Gioia & Chittipeddi 
1991; Humphreys & Brown 2002; Isabella 1990). Through 
these social processes, organisational members develop 
new understandings and interpretations, thus providing 
meaning to change. 
Middle manager’s role has traditionally been to 
implement what the top management expects them 
to do. However, not only top managements have the 
ability in influencing sensemaking to others (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi 1991), middle managers can also influence 
the top management through sensegiving, affecting how 
they see change which eventually affecting the overall 
change outcome (Dutton & Ashford 1993). What is 
most interesting in the literature of sensemaking and 
change is that middle managers are positioned as central 
to both strategic and frontline managers. This entails 
middle managers as sensemaking mediators between 
top management and the rest of the employees (Maitlis 
& Sonenshein 2010). What many of these studies were 
beginning to unravel is that middle managers are not 
merely organisational members, but their role is important 
in understanding organisational sensemaking activities 
such as in change. Central to the entire discussion of 
middle management and change is that sensemaking, as 
a theoretical lens, helps to unpack various nuances related 
to power and politics in the organisation. 
POWER AND POLITICS
Recently, there seems to be a steady stream of research 
exploring the power and politics phenomena (Buchanan 
2016; Buchanan & Macaulay 2014). A number of 
studies have found that subsidiary managers acted as 
key change agents, in strategic change initiatives where 
they were involved in micropolitical activities (Balogun, 
Jarzabkowski & Vaara 2011; Clark & Geppert 2011). 
Buchanan and Badham (1999) point out that the more 
extensive the implication of change in organisation, the 
greater the political activities by change agents will be. 
Subsidiary managers have been used to deploy within 
their power bases with several tactics to uphold certain 
self-preservation (Birkinshaw & Ridderstrale 1999; 
2008b). Tactics in the form of micro-political behaviours 
subsidiary managers’ enact can involve personal agenda, 
such as career ambition (Dorrenbacher & Geppert 2009). 
Hence, the authors argue that managerial practices are 
rather interactive processes as oppose to downright 
organisational rationalities. This imposition has great 
implication towards the approach of this study.
Studies from the inside, exploring key actors and 
their roles, through an in-depth direct interview can help 
researchers to better understand some of their “irrational” 
actions in change processes. Hope (2010) for example, 
outlines in his study how middle managers deliberately 
made divergent response to steer the course of change 
initiatives. He further posits a strong bond between power, 
politics, sensemaking, and sensegiving. Where there is 
power there is resistance, while similarly as power is 
expansive, agentless web, it is unpredictable and is a form 
restriction but not a focal point of convergence (Hardy & 
Phillips 2004).
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Hardy and Phillips (2004) suggested that actors within 
the realm of power associated with (i) formal power; (ii) 
critical resources; (iii) network links; and (iv) discursive 
legitimacy have the capacity to carry particular meanings 
and to create specific impacts. Formal power refers to a 
position that is associated with power such as decision-
making power. Actors that occupy subject positions in 
organisational change are more likely to be able to carry 
out the meaning of change till the end (Maitlis & Lawrence 
2007). Secondly, certain positions are associated with 
access to critical resources that may include expertise, 
funds, IT, specific contacts and credibility. Thirdly, an 
actor may be powerful through network links - internally 
or externally that allows actors ‘to exercise power through 
constituting alliances, integrating rather than merely 
dominating subordinate groups, winning their consent, 
achieving a precarious equilibrium’ (Fairclough 1992: 
94). Finally, actors in this position are understood to be 
communicating legitimately in relevant concern areas 
(Phillips & Brown 1993). These aspirant actors must be 
seen or validated by the right set of people to be considered 
having the right to speak (Taylor et al. 1996).   
METHODOLOGY
BACKGROUND OF CASE STUDY
The study is designed as a multiple embedded case study 
(Yin 2003). It is conducted in CenCo a Malaysia based 
MNC, where a centre-led change initiative was studied 
over a period of four years. Real-time, longitudinal data 
were gathered across four subsidiaries in four different 
countries in Asia. CenCo, one of Asia’s largest telecom 
operator with approximately 320 million subscribers is 
headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see Figure 
1) with 10 subsidiaries spanning from Iran to Indonesia. 
Four subsidiaries were picked based on their status 
as strong contributors to CenCo primarily in terms 
of monetary profits namely InCo-Indonesia, BaCo-
Bangladesh, LaCo-Sri Lanka and MyCo-Malaysia. 
These subsidiaries were chosen due to its “high power 
and voice” which according to Mudambi, Pedersen, 
& Andersson (2014) are unlikely to follow what the 
headquarter instruct them to do. 
FIGURE 1. CenCo group of companies’ profiles
The unit chosen for this study is the business assurance 
service (BAS) department. This department works as a 
shared service, with the group department head sitting 
at the centre, while subsidiary managers in their relevant 
countries. The primary aim of this department is to achieve 
operational excellence through uncompromising integrity 
and exceptional performance. The change initiative was 
chosen because this new major processes is significant and 
involved a group wide implementation. Following this, the 
central electronic management system (CEMS) initiative, 
an electronic work program and reporting tool was 
identified. Among the expected benefits of implementing 
CEMS are structured entity's risk assessment, electronic 
work papers, systematic and time flexibility (via web) 
can be maintained.
DATA COLLECTION 
The primary aim of this paper is to explore the organisational 
politics that emerge when middle managers particularly 
from subsidiaries operate in the development of a change 
initiative led by the headquarter. Three unstructured 
questions were posed: (1) Tell me about yourself? How did 
you get here to doing this job? (2) One of the things that I 
am particularly interested is on the subject of how strategic 
initiative unfolds. I need you to share about the history 
of the CEMS initiative? (3) Who else you think might 
help me in this matter that we have discussed? The three 
unstructured questions allow freedom for the interviewees 
to express matters pertaining to their unique experience 
and within their own meaning of the constructs. 
JP 55(2018) Bab 14 .indd   171 12/17/2019   12:42:52 PM
172 Jurnal Pengurusan 55
TABLE 1. Interviewees profiles
         Designation  Unit                                                       Profile Descriptors
(1) CxO Centre A Malaysian who was formerly the finance director of an oil and gas MNE based in 
   Kuala Lumpur. He reports directly to the Group’s Board. All subsidiary managers are Head of 
   Department (HOD) they dually report to the CxO and the local board. 
(2) Manager BaCo A Bangladeshi with 7 years of experience in the MNE (tobacco industry) at different 
   capacity.  
(3) Manager InCo An Indonesian with an engineering background and with 8 years of experience in the local 
   telecommunication industry.  
(4) Manager LaCo A Sri Lankan with an engineering degree qualification and several years of experience in a similar 
   role.  
(5) Manager MyCo A Malaysian with a solid background in procurement, he reports directly to the CxO. 
(6) Manager Centre Specialist, she is in charge the financial aspect of the department. An accountant by profession, 
   she has various certifications under her portfolio.  
(7) Manager Centre A senior lead specialist in the department. He specialises in project management and general 
   management. He reports directly to the CxO. 
(8) Deputy Manager BaCo A senior specialist in general management, he reports directly to the HOD (Bangladesh) and in 
   charge of the general management of the subsidiary.  
(9) Assistant Manager BaCo A specialist in marketing, he reports directly to the HOD (Bangladesh). He has a pool of staffs 
   under him.  
(10) Assistant Manager BaCo An IT specialist, he reports directly to the HOD (Bangladesh). He was formerly a local bank’s 
   technical manager for IT related works. A pool of team reports to him.  
(11) Senior Analyst BaCo An engineer by profession, he reports directly to the HOD (Bangladesh). He joined the company 
   a fresh graduate and rose to the current position  
(12) Senior Analyst BaCo A marketing specialist with several regional postings across Bangladesh, he reports directly to 
   the HOD.  
(13) Assistant Manager LaCo A qualified accountant, he reports directly to the HOD (Sri Lanka). He is the delegation of 
   authority (DOA) when the HOD is out of the country.  
(14) Assistant Manager MyCo An accountant by profession and an IT certified assessor. He was formerly a manager in Qatar 
   and was hired to head the IT unit of the department. He reports to the GM of IT 
   (Malaysia).   
(15) Assistant Manager InCo An IT specialist, he reports directly to the HOD (Indonesia). He was formerly the IT development 
   and operations (devops) team of the subsidiary. He is assigned specifically as the subsidiary 
   system administrator.  
(16) Deputy Manager InCo An accountant by profession, she reports directly to the HOD (Indonesia). She has a wide span 
   of experience in the subsidiary.  
(17) Deputy Manager LaCo An accountant by profession, he reports directly to the HOD (Sri Lanka). His previous experience 
   at a local bank and knowledge in IT were the primary reasons for his hiring.  
(18) Senior Lead Analyst MyCo An engineer by profession, he reports directly to the HOD (Malaysia). He is among the most 
   senior within the subsidiary.  
(19) Assistant Manager MyCo She is the IT specialist and reports directly to the HOD (Malaysia). She has a pool of team that 
   reports to her directly.  
(20) Assistant Manager LaCo An accountant by profession, he reports directly to the DOA (Sri Lanka).  
(21) Senior Analyst InCo An IT graduate and in charge of IT related tasks. He reports directly to the IT Manager 
   (Indonesia).  
(22) Senior Lead Analyst LaCo A computer science degree holder, he reports directly to the HOD (Sri Lanka). He oversees all 
   general management related issues within the department. 
A total of 22 unstructured interviews were conducted 
between March 2014 and May 2016 with key actors who 
are involved in the initiative in four different countries. 
A focus group interview was conducted in Sri Lanka for 
LaCo that comprised of new and season users that had 
successfully completed two or more reports via CEMS. 
The interviewees included one CxO at the centre, four 
subsidiary managers, a centre manager reporting to the 
CxO and the remaining are employees of the subsidiaries 
(see Table 1). The interviews were primarily conducted 
in English. However, the informants sometime use their 
native language interchangeably. At the end of each 
interview, confirmation of the ambiguous meaning was 
done almost immediately. Each interview ranged from 
20 to 100 minutes per session. All interviews were tape 
recorded except for two hours in which the information 
was gathered at informal settings such as at tea breaks, 
they were hand written and transcribed immediately. 
The transcription work was assisted by two professional 
transcribers. 
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DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis was performed simultaneously with data 
collection as recommended by Miles and Huberman 
(1994). The data was examined across various informants, 
level and sources. This facilitates in going through a data 
validity process for qualitative study (Saunders, Lewis 
& Thornhill 2009: 142-143). This is sometimes referred 
to as a form of triangulation. A two-order analysis (Gioia 
& Chittipeddi 1991) was performed on the data set. 
The first order analysis is performed in searching for 
themes and patterns that were included and perceived to 
be meaningful. The first order analysis is similar to an 
ethnographic analytical technique performed in order to 
identify themes and patterns. This includes meaningful 
information provided by interviewees in the research. 
The second order analysis is a more theoretical data 
analysis where the outcomes of the first order analysis 
were examined for underlying meanings. Such underlying 
meanings that may create patterns are not necessarily 
apparent to the informants but are essential to this study.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
FIRST-ORDER ANALYSIS
Two primary phases of CEMS were observed throughout 
its development starting from planning to implementation 
and later the Business-As-Usual (BAU). The planning 
to implementation phase is where those involved are 
exposed to situations of uncertainty, confusion and re-
enactment as described by Weick (1988). The BAU phase 
is where individuals involved perform mental schema of 
sensemaking activities of selection and retention. 
The first-order analysis revolves at looking for 
sensemaking processes involve in the change initiative. 
It involves scanning all issues that arise between the 
centre and the subsidiary managers. The issues are then 
filtered based on the set criteria such as its significance 
and applicability to all informants. Next, the issues are 
reconfirmed with all informants before narratives are 
developed surrounding key issues from interviews, field 
notes, meetings, reports and other secondary sources. 
This process is performed at two different layers, namely 
centre-subsidiary, subsidiary-internal (see Appendix A). 
During the planning to implementation phase, 
CenCo adopted a collective approach in introducing the 
CEMS initiative to its subsidiaries. Subsidiary managers 
were invited to Kuala Lumpur in 2014 for an awareness 
session on the CEMS automation process. Participants 
were solicited for their feedback and expectation on 
CEMS. Their expectation was high in anticipating that 
CEMS will transform and improve their work practices 
both in terms of workload and output deliverables. In 
that meeting, subsidiary managers raised several concerns 
with respect to data security and funding requirement but 
was assured by the CxO that those issues were trivial. 
For instance, the data centre in KL is fully secured with a 
24/7 protection both logically and physically. Meanwhile, 
for the funding issue, CenCo promised to fully cover the 
software license fees for those subsidiaries that cannot 
afford it. What follows next was that the vendor system 
integrator team was flown to each subsidiary to conduct 
a two-day CEMS installation program on each premise. 
This was followed by a two-day training for users and 
finally a one-day acceptance test. Except for InCo, other 
subsidiaries implement the CEMS as per the instruction 
of the CxO.
During the BAU phase, InCo Manager had two 
concerns about the CEMS: 1) data sovereignty, Indonesian 
law requires that company information must reside 
within its territories and 2) data security. During the year 
2014, data security practices were at its infancy stage. 
On these two issues, the InCo Manager and CxO were 
embroiled in several heated arguments, both stubbornly 
holding their ground. While InCo in 2014 was among 
CenCo’s strongest subsidiary both in terms of financial 
and the number of subscriber base, the conflict has led to 
subsidiary autonomous behaviours, resisting orders and 
directives from the centre (Mudambi & Navarra 2004; 
Mudambi, Pedersen & Andersson 2014). The above factor 
and together with the fact that CenCo’s shareholding in 
InCo (the lowest among other subsidiaries) paved the 
way for InCo Manager to be disengaged from the CEMS 
centre-led initiative, after a brief altercation that involved 
InCo’s local shareholders. The CxO recalled:
I engage their Board Members as well […], CEMS is a new system 
which is a database system that is accepted by the world, except 
for InCo. For InCo, we have this issue of independence; they 
don’t want to share the information. […]. So, we said “you pay 
for your own server” while CenCo maintains its own server for 
the rest (CxO).
CenCo began to incessantly push the subsidiaries to 
increase CEMS’ usage. The subsidiaries were unimpressed 
with this as many of CEMS problems that were reported 
was left unresolved, some were trivial issues such 
as procedural interpretation and drop-down menus, 
while others were more serious. The issues of network 
connectivity, lockout and information were serious enough 
that it is a show-stopper. As a result, CEMS users were left 
to resolve quite a lot of the problems. Three out of the 
four subsidiary managers (BaCo Manager, InCo Manager 
and LaCo Manager), started to discuss informally about 
CenCo’s constant pressure on CEMS deliverables. It is at 
this juncture that the notion of ‘Rebel Alliance’ began to 
emerge. What started out as informal discussions among 
subsidiary managers, grew into an alliance nicknamed 
the ‘Rebel Alliance’ that comprise of the BaCo Manager, 
InCo Manager and LaCo Manager. 
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SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS (SENSEMAKING IN 
CHANGE)
The second-order analysis involves analysing the centre 
and subsidiary managers’ sensegiving and identifying 
process characteristics of organisational sensemaking. 
The steps involve confirm that all individuals are involved 
in most of the key issues identified earlier, identifying a 
list of sensegiving activities, matching them to the key 
issues identified and grouping into 3 categories namely 
centre, subsidiary and internal sensegiving roles. Finally, 
each centre-subsidiary, subsidiary-subsidiary, subsidiary-
internal interaction is examined for each form to determine 
their characteristics (see Appendix A). 
Within the multitude of sensegiving and sensemaking 
activities, the authors deduced two patterns of interaction 
each for the two CEMS phases. In the planning/
implementation phase, a superficial/abstract pattern of 
interaction.  At this stage, heated exchanges of words 
between the CxO Manager InCo was quite prevalent. 
Disagreements stem from as basic of how the initiative 
should be implemented to more technical issues such 
as system architecture and data security. Activities are 
described such as light conversation, low understanding 
and light discussion. Whereas at the BAU phase, an 
entrenched/specific pattern of interaction is described. 
Activities are described such as intense and confrontational 
discussion, and direct and one-on-one directives. These are 
quite a number of intense and confrontational approach 
that subsidiary managers were exposed to dealing with 
CenCo. At a later stage of CEMS, BaCo manager recalled 
how the CxO enforced that the CEMS usage update be 
made a permanent agenda for all meetings. He saw this 
as CenCo’s way of using the ‘name and shame’ approach 
towards those that do not comply with their instructions. 
Several other actions were followed such the KPI settings 
with major CEMS deliverable components.
Finally, the authors identified commonalities in 
each account associated with each form and performing 
iterative analysis to build a more abstract description of 
the sensemaking form. What emerged from this is two 
sensemaking forms namely communication intensity 
and resolution to barriers. Communication intensity 
refers to the intensity of the enacted sensemaking and 
sensegiving between actors involved throughout the change 
development. Several layers of communication happening 
at the same time, namely: (1) the centre with subsidiary 
managers, (2) subsidiary managers with their internal 
teams and, (3) peer subsidiary managers.  Resolution to 
barriers refers to the efforts taken to overcome barriers to 
the change initiative. Anand and Barsoux (2017) defined 
barriers or blockers as vital components of change that 
need to be targeted when it happens.
SOURCES OF POWER 
This paper has identified how centre-led change initiative 
encountered divergent actions and perceptions by change 
recipients (Kostova & Roth 2002).  For instance, while the 
CxO refers CEMS as a ‘seamless system’ or an ‘establish an 
MNC practice’, the subsidiaries carried across a different 
meaning about CEMS. They mock it as the ‘dumping 
data’, ‘added burden’ or ‘repository’ system. Due to 
the non-satisfaction and misunderstanding between the 
centre and subsidiaries, the subsidiaries have amid their 
political tactics which they believe had promoted to both 
their subsidiary and group interest (Buchanan 1999). 
Hence, these subsidiaries applied tactics based on the 
sources of power that they have.  Based on the work of 
Hardy and Phillips (2004), this study has identified four 
forms of power namely formal power, critical resources, 
network links, and discursive legitimacy that influence 
the implementation of centre-led change initiative at 
CenCo.  
The alliance members which we term as ‘Rebel 
Alliance’ have within their resources subject matter 
experts such as in information technology, operations and 
finance (Birkinshaw, Hood & Young 2005; Dorrenbacher 
& Gammelgaard 2006). In some of their political ploys, 
they carefully harness the different expertise within their 
teams to challenge the credibility of the vendor, centre and 
CEMS system architecture. Hence, it can be seen on how 
critical resources were carefully used by the alliance in 
realizing their political agenda (see Table 2).
The alliance members challenged the vendor 
by downplaying their capability, they achieved the 
combination of critical resource – knowledge of manual 
process versus the automated CEMS system, network 
links – knowledge from BaCo and LaCo experience and 
discursive legitimacy – support from internal staffs and 
alliance members support in central meetings. The alliance 
challenged the CEMS system architecture by highlighting 
the various problems they encountered, especially during 
peak business hours (KL time). In this, they again pull 
the same sources of power based on their resources of 
expertise in BaCo and support from the more advanced 
InCo. Discursive legitimacy was achieved through the 
various testimonies that the alliance garner from members, 
local employees and the CEMS vendor. 
The alliance next took control of how CEMS is to 
operate together with its system architecture, this was 
achieved through the network links where the more 
experience InCo supported BaCo and LaCo. BaCo 
Manager had his IT team to ‘thrash out’ the CEMS system 
for an entire month, this led to the ‘checkout function’, 
‘101-checklist’ and KPI workaround. InCo Manager 
restructured his team and dedicated specialist team in 
managing CEMS while allowing other team members to 
carry on with their day-to-day work. This allows for a 
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TABLE 2. Applied tactics and the sources of power
     Sources of Power       Applied Tactics               Purpose                                Evidence
Critical Resource,  Challenging and  Taking control over all The system was taken log, stock and barrel without 
Network Links downplaying the  processes, applications  even trying to customize it in terms of how we 
Discursive Legitimacy vendor’s and reporting of the  use it. For example, everybody was used to the 
competence  system term “Risk Assessment Matrix,” it is a table matrix 
   on how we test it, what are the questions to test those 
   risks, unlike the vendor’s different definition.
Critical Resource, Challenging the Taking over how to In that meeting we discuss the key point which is 
Network Links,  system architecture remote access and use  about the efficiency at that time e.g. VPN Connectivity 
Discursive Legitimacy  the system did not work. The next best option […] is to have it 
   installed locally and there is absolutely no need for 
   us to buy servers because we were doing virtual 
   servers. 
Formal Power, Critical  Taking control of Taking charge of the In BaCo, […] my team started writing their own 
Resource, Discursive  how the system is  system application, manual - how to use the system – and essentially, we 
Legitimacy to be used e.g.   communication and did a lot of “trial and error,” trying to know how we 
 Checkout function reporting can use the system. It is a good system, it has a lot 
   of capabilities, but I guess a lot of these capabilities 
   were not really tested or not really developed.
Critical Resource,  Taking charge of how Shaping the perception So that was the start of the journey and luckily 
Discursive Legitimacy the system architecture of stakeholders about enough, our IT team at that time was very, very 
 is to be planned internal expertise strong. I gave them the liberty of playing around 
   with the system, they trashed the system until they 
   know essentially what is the bare minimum that we 
   must provide input into the system […] slowly but 
   surely from that point onwards we started to build 
   on this, started to build our own understanding.
Formal Power, Critical  Taking charge of how Strengthening and The end objective of having a system is what we 
Resource, Network  to drive the initiative justifying the local should be focusing on and therefore any behavior 
Links, Discursive (Rebel Alliance)  drives taken which are not supporting that objective should be 
Legitimacy   minimized and that’s the thing that we tell everybody. 
   This system that we want to develop will now starts 
   to store all the information, starts to build all the 
   knowledge, starts to build all the capabilities that 
   we want, starts to build all the analytics or all the 
   analysis. 
Formal Power, Network  Making use of the  Forcing the centre to We continuously pushed until it is too painful for
Links, Discursive  PIR CEMS report acknowledge the CenCo to do anything else other than stopped and
Legitimacy (Rebel Alliance) problem and perform  relooked at what has happened and fix everything
  corrective actions once and for all. 
   The PIR CEMS report was presented during the 
   divisional meeting, everyone was there, no one 
   challenge the findings at all.
Formal Power,  Forcing for the system Justifying for the What the centre wanted to do is very good. It is 
Network Links. to be decentralized system to be like centralizing everything but on my side, although 
 (Rebel Alliance) independently built  we see it as a good initiative but there was some 
   constraint. There were two constraints; one is the 
   technical capabilities of having a centralized database 
   application and the other is the regulatory requirement 
   (data sovereignty).
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smooth transition from the manual work process to the 
full CEMS work process. Taken together, this provides the 
alliance a sort of formal power, but also the discursive 
legitimacy during central meetings discussing about CEMS 
development. These several applied tactics allowed the 
alliance to take control over the process, reporting of CEMS, 
how to remotely access and use the system. In essence, 
the alliance was beginning to shape the stakeholders (such 
as board members) perception about subsidiary expertise 
on CEMS.
Next, the alliance took charge of how CEMS was to 
be deployed, they justified several efforts undertaken 
at subsidiaries such as the ‘Go Green’ drive, process 
automation and paperless environment, and analytics drive. 
All four sources of power were evident, such as driving 
the campaigns at subsidiary (formal power), learning 
and deploying internal initiatives across member alliance 
(critical resources and network links) and presenting in 
discussion platform as a pact (discursive legitimacy). Up 
to this, the tactics have allowed the alliance to control 
the meaning of CEMS, they nicknamed it as the ‘dumping 
data’ and ‘repository.’ 
They next concerted push for the centre to commission 
a post implementation review (PIR) of CEMS due to the 
incessant unresolved issues. With the network links 
together with the critical resource, they managed to 
convince CenCo to appoint Manager BaCo to lead the PIR. 
Post the PIR report presentation where all of the unresolved 
issues confirmed and most of the CEMS objectives 
unachieved, the alliance finally achieved their ultimate 
goal of build their respective standalone CEMS system 
(decentralise). Alliance members concertedly build upon 
each other’s strength both internally in each subsidiary 
(subject matter experts) and peer-to-peer subsidiary. The 
alliance formed, provided a powerful force that tilted the 
centre power base (Fairclough 1992: 94). 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION
This study has explored change initiative from inside of 
the firm looking at why individuals do what they do was 
examine through the sensemaking lens. The two patterns 
of sensemaking/sensegiving that emerged from this study 
offers centre managers a glimpse of how the development 
of change progresses over a period of time. In this study 
we see how the centre manager appear to employ the 
coopetition strategy (Luo 2005). It was implemented 
through sensegiving the meaning of the initiatives (Maitlis 
& Lawrence 2007). The centre assigned meaning to the 
initiative such in the CEMS case, they sensegive to the 
subsidiary that it was about emulating establish MNEs 
via office automation. The implementation by InCo have 
gone beyond just the normal, e.g. CEMS, they are now 
using CEMS in business intelligence and for data analytics. 
BaCo and LaCo both came second to InCo, they both 
showed high level of implementation but lack the adoption 
of the practise. Hence, we recommend that practitioner 
pay close attention to change recipients throughout the 
development phase of the change, especially change that 
require extensive resources from subsidiaries.  
Taken together, top managers need to pay close 
attention to change recipients throughout the development 
phase of the change especially change that require 
extensive resources from subsidiaries. Any confusion or 
uncertainties needed to be address as quickly as possible. 
They also need to address the behavioural aspect of those 
involve in change by controlling what is being sensegive 
to change recipients and at the same time monitor what 
meaning are being sensemake throughout the change 
development. 
CONCLUSION 
This study explored middle management political tactics 
in centre-led change initiative. Recent literatures have 
confirmed middle managers’ significant role in the 
development of strategic change initiatives (Appelbaum 
et al. 2017; Bakari, Hunjra & Niazi 2017; Sarkar & 
Osiyevskyy 2017). Middle management have within 
their span of resources the power to choose whether to 
act convergently or divergently towards the imposed 
change. 
This study shows how middle managers through 
several political tactics deployed both at their individual 
levels or concertedly via the ‘Rebel Alliance’ which 
managed to alter the change outcome of CEMS. Within 
this array of confusion, they had grouped together in what 
they call themselves as the ‘Rebel Alliance’ in deploying 
political tactics against the centre. The ‘Rebel Alliance,’ 
taking a more protagonist role (Maitlis & Christianson 
2014), managed to steer the course of the CEMS change 
initiative through the control of various forms of power. 
They accomplished this by carefully manipulating the 
meaning of change at different stages (Balogun 2006; 
Balogun et al. 2005). Micropolitical behaviours enacted by 
middle managers harnessing the four power forms (Hardy 
& Phillips 2004) allows us to better understand how 
applied tactics are interwoven with purpose and goal. 
The specific aim of this paper is to explore the 
organisational politics of middle managers when faced 
with competing roles in centre-led change initiatives. 
We observed that when faced with external and internal 
factors such as in centre-led change initiatives, change 
agents or subsidiary managers will not necessarily 
follow the Centre’s instruction (Bouquet & Birkinshaw 
2008a, 2008b). Due to this, the CEMS initiative, originally 
designed as a centralised work and reporting system had 
evolved overtime and turn into a decentralized system 
at CenCo today. In this study we see how subsidiary 
managers’ capability and power to do otherwise allows 
them to shape the course of a change initiative, thus 
determining the change outcome. 
This study is conducted in an Asian setting which puts 
constraints to generalizability of the findings in other parts 
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of the world or even in different industries. This study 
investigates to understand why and how individuals do 
certain things the way they do in change, in doing so, we 
managed to scratch only the surface in unearthing few 
middle managers’ micro-political behaviours. Recently 
there appears to be a strong interest in qualitative study 
through narratives and discourse analysis (Balogun et 
al. 2014; Guimarães & Alves 2014). Perhaps future 
research should consider using some of these theoretical 
perspective in unravelling the different plots through 
layers of different discourses that may exist within 
employees, middle managers and senior managements 
(Hardy & Maguire 2010).  
This study contributes to the current literature on 
organisational sensemaking by providing insight into 
rich qualitative accounts from informants involved in 
political behaviours in change. This enhances the existing 
change literature by broadening our understanding of how 
managers enact political behaviours in change, as they 
manoeuvre along the power corridor.
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